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COMMENTS
The Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea: Questions of
Equity for American Business
Three decades ago, the search for petroleum and natural gas
moved to the ocean floor. Offshore exploration, modestly begun in
shallow water, opened up a new frontier in petroleum exploration and
exploitation which now extends to water depths beyond 1600 feet. To-
day, the seabeds off the shores of coastal countries supply approxi-
mately seven percent of the world's oil and gas requirements.' Yet only
a small portion of the world's continental shelves have actually been
tested for their natural resource potential, and exploration of the poten-
tial petroleum and natural gas supply of the deep seabed is still in its
infancy.
Concern over each nation's legal entitlement to these resources,
and the manner in which the ocean, the sea floor, and all the ocean's
resources might be explored and exploited has increased with the re-
source discoveries.2 Pursuant to resolution,3 the United Nations con-
vened the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III)' to address these complex issues, to establish an inter-
national framework for the exploration and exploitation of the world's
ocean resources, to delimit the boundaries of national jurisdiction, and
to develop, in effect, a "constitution for the sea."5
I R. ANAND, LEGAL REGIME OF THE SEABED AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19-20
(1976), citing Gardner, Huge Off Shore Growth Set for 1970's, 1970 OIL & GAS J. 126.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 14-29.
3 G.A. Res. 2750, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 25-26, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970).
4 For a discussion of the proceedings of UNCLOS III dealing with seabed mining, see T.
KRONMILLER, 1 THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING 41-81 (1981).
5 Johnson & van Voorst, .4 Constitutionfor the Seas, TIME, Sept. 8, 1980, at 42.
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Although the original impetus for UNCLOS III was the search for
petroleum resources beneath the ocean floor, numerous sessions6 cul-
minating in an extensive negotiating text7 failed to establish a regime
for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources beyond the
200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)8 or in the deep seabed.9 On
March 3, 1981, the Reagan Administration announced that it would
not finalize the Law of the Sea Treaty (Treaty) in the spring of 1981.10
Citing "serious problems"' in the negotiating text requiring further re-
view as the rationale for delay, the Administration refused to negotiate
further on substantive issues.12 After presenting a brief historical back-
ground of ocean resource exploration and exploitation, this comment
will focus on the necessity of including a regime in the Treaty for the
exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources. This comment
will argue that certain provisions potentially affecting the petroleum
industry must be amended before the Treaty will be an acceptable
"package deal" 3 to the United States and its private petroleum and
natural gas industry, offering equitable treatment for both developed
and developing countries.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Early debates over ownership of the deep seabed centered around
the concept of res nullius and res communis. Res nullius, meaning that
the seabed belongs to no one, allows resources to be appropriated by
possession and an exercise of control, thus permitting national appro-
priation and sovereignty.' 4 Under res communis, the seabed belongs to
everyone, and title to the resources may be gained only through posses-
sion adverse to the world community."5 These concepts became dor-
6 To date, 10 sessions have been held over the past eight years. The last session was held in
New York on March 9, 1981.
7 Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Infor-
mal Text), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/W.P.10/Rev. 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Draft].
8 1d art. 57.
9 Hydrocarbons and liquid substances are resources of the deep seabed under Article 133, but
articles relating to the exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed refer only to mineral re-
sources. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. Although there has been considerable discus-
sion at the Conference about the exploitation of manganese nodules in the deep seabed, no
discussion has taken place concerning the exploitation of petroleum resources.
10 N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 5.
11 Id
12 Id
13 Elliot Richardson on the Seabed Talks, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 23, col. 1.
14 Goldie,.A Selection ofBooksR~eeting Perspectives in the SeabedMining Debate: Part I, 15
INT'L LAW. 293, 304 (1981).
15 Id
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mant as Hugo Grotius' position that the seas were free for everyone's
use emerged and became dominant.16 But the sharp increase in the use
of the ocean, particularly for resource extraction on the floor of the
continental shelf and ocean, resulted in a revival of these two concepts.
Unfortunately, the concepts provide little aid in solving the modem
ownership problem."
The revival of the debate concerning resource ownership in the
ocean domain stemmed largely from the discovery of oil on the conti-
nental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico. 8 The impact of this discovery on
the law of the sea first was expressed as early as 1945, when President
Truman proclaimed that the United States had the exclusive right to
explore and exploit the mineral resources' 9 of the continental shelf, in-
cluding the area that extended beyond the three mile territorial sea.20
Many countries soon followed President Truman's initiative, some
claiming exclusive jurisdiction extending 200 miles.2
As these claims were contrary to the traditional law of the sea, a
Convention on the Continental Shelf was convened in Geneva in
195822 to coordinate jurisdictional claims and to limit national jurisdic-
tion over the resources of the ocean floor. This Convention confirmed
the exclusive sovereign rights of coastal states to natural resources on
their continental shelf.2 3 But "exploitability" and "adjacency," the cri-
teria used to define the limits of the continental shelf, 4 proved ambigu-
ous, uncertain, and controversial.2 5 Some coastal states interpreted
these criteria to justify their extension of jurisdiction to include the reg-
ulation of navigation, fishing, laying of cables and pipelines, and scien-
tific research in the waters above the continental shelf. Others
16 See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 103-04 (1962).
17 One author commented:
There is little doubt that the old debate about the high seas being res nullius or res communir
is fruitless and can serve no purpose. The old law was developed, or was left undeveloped,
under very different circumstances. The uses of the sea were few and the uses we think of
today were unthinkable at that time.
R. ANAND, supra note 1, at 178-79.
18 Swing, The Law ofthe Sea, in THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS 128, 129 (D. Kay ed.
1977).
19 At that time, "mineral resources" meant oil. Id at 128.
20 Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 39 (1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
21 See Swing, supra note 18, at 130.
22 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 474, T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
23 Id art. II. Continental shelf is defined in Article I of the Convention and refers:
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area
of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent water admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said area; (b) to
the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
24 Id art. I.
25 See R. ANAND, supra note 1, at 139.
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interpreted the terms as granting exclusive jurisdiction over the entire
continental margin,26 while some states, particularly developing, land-
locked, and shelf-locked states, interpreted coastal jurisdiction in the
light of justice and equity which required a narrow jurisdiction over the
continental shelf.
In order to combat the dangers of "creeping jurisdiction, '2 7 Am-
bassador Parvi of the Permanent Mission of Malta proposed in a note
verbale to the United Nations General Assembly a discontinuation of
the seaward claims of coastal states and asked the United Nations to
declare the seabed and ocean floor to be "the common heritage of man-
kind. '2 8 He further proposed to establish an international agency to
manage the resources of the ocean floor.29 This principle was adopted
by the United Nations, which established a Permanent Seabed Com-
mittee to study the problem of utilization and development of these
resources for the benefit of mankind.30 The Committee concluded that
the problems of interpretation should be solved by a treaty among all
nations and, consequently, UNCLOS III was convened in 1973. 3'
The Treaty was negotiated on the basis of consensus. Thus, all
nations party to the negotiations must join in ratifying the Treaty or it
will not become effective.32 Nations have negotiated the terms of the
26 The continental margin consists of the continental shelf, rise, and slope.
27 Creeping jurisdiction refers to the continued expansion of natural jurisdiction over the con-
tinental shelf and into the deep seabed as technology to exploit these areas developed. The devel-
oping countries fear this expansion will cause an inequitable distribution of the ocean's resources.
R. ANAND, supra note I, at 110.
28 Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations, Request for the Inclusion of a Supple-
mentary Item in the Agenda of the Twenty-Second Session, 22 U.N. GAOR Annex 3, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/6695 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Parvi Note Verbale]. This phrase was quickly adopted by
the United States, but has not yet been clearly defined. Several commentators have discussed this
problem:
It is one thing to agree with the principle of common heritage and another to define what
common heritage means. Does it mean that a nation has to share the fish and oil and gas they
might acquire on the high seas? That a nation has to provide upfront for other nations to go
out and compete-mandatory transfer of technology?
N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, § V, at 5, col. 1 (interview with Senator Breaux). See also Lila, Third
World's Sea Pact Takes U.S. for a Ride, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 20, col. 3. ("Though ill
defined, the phrase [common heritage of mankind] proved catchy, the resolution passed and soon
the words were heard at diplomatic cocktail parties and academic conferences around the
world."); Goldie, supra note 14, at 307.
29 Parvi Note erbale, supra note 28, at 3. Ambassador Parvi, through this resolution, sought
to prevent the developed countries from exploiting the seabed for their own benefit and to further
the developing countries' desire to create a New International Economic Order (NIEO). See
Safire, The Great Ro-off , N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1981, § 1, at 23, col. 5; Eliot Richardson on the
Seabed Talks, supra note 13; Parvi Note Verbale, supra note 28, at 3.
30 G.A. Res. 2750, supra note 3.
31 For a review of the proceedings, see T. KRONMILLER, supra note 4, at 24-36.
32 N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1981, § A, at I, col. 5.
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Treaty during the last eight years, culminating in an informal compos-
ite negotiating text (the Draft). Prior to the Reagan Administration's
announcement that it would not conclude negotiations last March, all
nations had anticipated that the Treaty would be finalized and pre-
pared for review by participating governments last spring.3
DEFICIENCIES OF THE PRESENT DRAFT
The most obvious deficiency of the present text which affects the
petroleum industry is its failure to include a regime for the production
of petroleum resources in the area beyond the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ). Additionally, several other Treaty provisions which con-
trol activities in the deep seabed (the Area) threaten to impose signifi-
cant financial burdens on the petroleum industry. Since the major
barriers to development of these resources are economic, rather than
technological, 4 provisions that place substantial economic burdens on
the industry must be scrutinized carefully to ensure that they do not
make exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources unduly pro-
hibitive. The provisions most unfavorable to the petroleum industry
are: (1) the administrative, operational, and funding system of the In-
ternational Seabed Authority (the Authority);3 5 (2) the mandatory
transfer of technology to developing countries;36 (3) the scientific re-
search directed toward future exploitation;37 and (4) the lack of a
"grandfather clause" protecting interests of those engaged in activity
beyond the EEZ prior to signing the Treaty. 8
Lack of Spec#c Provisionsfor the Exploration and Exploitation of
Petroleum Resources in the Deep Seabed
Although the definition of resources in the Area39 includes petro-
leum and gas,40 production policies developed for the Area 4' are di-
33 Id
34 See ifra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
35 Draft, supra note 7, arts. 150-91 & Annex III. See infra text accompanying notes 63-118.
36 Id Annex III, art. 5. See infra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
37 Id arts. 238-65. The reader should particularly note Article 246. See infra notes 132-52
and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
39 The Area refers to "the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction." Draft, supra note 7, art. 1(1).
40 Draft, supra note 7, art. 133. Article 133 states, in relevant part: "(a) resources means
mineral resources in situ when received from the Area, such resources shall be regarded as miner-
als. (b) resources shall include (i) liquid or gaseous sustances at or beneath the surface such as
petroleum, gas .. "
41 Id art. 151.
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rected only toward nickel and metallic resources.42  The records of the
proceedings of the Conference43 do not expose the rationale for the
exclusion of production policies for petroleum and natural gas, but
there seem to be three possible reasons for the lack of specificity:
(1) lack of certainty of the amount of petroleum resources in the deep
seabed; (2) lack of technological capacity at the beginning of negotia-
tions to exploit the deep seabed; and (3) belief that there are adequate
resources available to meet United States requirements in the immedi-
ate future.
1. Lack of certainty of amount ofpetroleum resources in the deep
seabed
The petroleum industry has expressed little interest in negotiations
involving the deep seabed because of its belief that there is only a small
amount of petroleum buried in the ocean floor. Before the petroleum
industry attempts to exploit the deep seabed, profitability of such a ven-
ture must be certain.' The economic attractiveness of deep water ven-
tures depends on many factors: (1) the overall demand for petroleum;
(2) competition from land-and-shallow-water areas; (3) the relative
cost-effectiveness of deep marine production operations;45 (4) the rela-
tive productivity of deep marine petroleum deposits; and (5) competi-
tion from oil shale, tar sands, coal, and other energy resources. This
section will discuss the possible productivity of deep marine petroleum
deposits.
Currently, precise data about the potential petroleum reserves be-
neath the seabed beyond national jurisdiction is sparse.46  Approxi-
42 Id For example, Article 151, part 2(b) states, in relevant part: "[Tihe production ceiling for
any year of the interim period beginning with the year of the earliest commercial production shall
be the sum of (i) and (ii) below: (i) the difference between the trend line values for annual nickel
consumption .. " (emphasis added).
43 For a discussion of the Conference proceedings, see T. KRONMILLER, supra note 4, at 41-81.
44 See, e.g., Richardson, Seabed Mining andLaw ofthe Sea, DEPT. STATE BULL., Dec. 1980, at
60, 61.
45 Production costs include: (1) reservoir size; (2) water depth; (3) climatic conditions; and
(4) government take, including the cost of leases, royalty payments, taxes, government bonuses,
and additional government payments. Nigrelli, Ocean MineralRevenue Sharing, 5 OCEAN DEv. &
INT'L L.J. 153, 162 (1978). Assuming that the production provisions for deep seabed mining are
relevant to offshore petroleum production, government take would also include an application fee
and the amount subject to revenue sharing under Annex III, Article 13. See Draft, supra note 7,
Annex VII, art. 13.
46 The controversy over whether there are petroleum supplies worth exploiting in the deep
seabed stems from a lack of knowledge about the potential of that area. Although offshore explo-
ration has dramatically increased worldwide in recent years, detailed knowledge of the sediments
of the continental slopes and shelves remains meager, and even less is known about the sediments
beyond the continental margins. The rapid increase in knowledge about the potential petroleum
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mately fifty-five to seventy percent of all oil lies under water up to 200
miles below sea level.47 Although some geologists believe that there is
no potential petroleum supply under the ocean floor because of the
area's geological make-up, there is evidence that there are hydrocar-
bons in the sediments of almost all oceanic areas, and, therefore, the
prospects of petroleum accumulation in some degree cannot be ex-
cluded with regard to any of the ocean provinces. 48 Available informa-
tion suggests that over most of the deep-ocean basins there is a
relatively thin sedimentary section and probably only scanty reservoir
beds.49 However, even in these deep ocean provinces, there are areas of
adequate sedimentary thickness and indications of favorable trap struc-
ture.50 Thus, the prospects for the discovery of petroleum pools in the
Area seem promising. Petroleum geologists currently believe there is
more oil in the sediments of the continental margins which, in many
cases, are beyond the 200 mile EEZ. 5' But as more and more of the
present supply is consumed without a corresponding drop in demand,
whatever resources are available in the Area may be significant and
resources of the oceans is highlighted by reviewing progress in offshore exploration during UN-
CLOS III negotiations. Early in the negotiations, no oil had been discovered even close to the
limit of the 200 mile EEZ. Since that time, however, offshore exploration has increased enor-
mously. Recently, a large oil reservoir was discovered at Ben-Nevis off the Newfoundland coast
just beyond the 200 mile line. Garcia-Mata, An Oil RipoffHas Been Aborted, N.Y. Times, Apr.
15, 1981, § I, at 30, col. 6. Further exploration of the Area is being conducted to ascertain the
extent of the petroleum reserves in the deep seabed. It seems reasonable to predict that more exact
knowledge about the petroleum supply will be available soon and that these resources will be
exploited. The United States demand for oil has continued to increase. In 1985, the United States
is expected to consume 9.5 billion barrels as compared to over 6.3 billion barrels in 1973. Nigrelli,
supra note 45, at 156. For a discussion of the adequacy of the present supply to meet future needs,
see infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
47 For a discussion of potential development of these resources, see NATIONAL PETROLEUM
COUNCIL, THE OCEAN FRONTIER AND AMERICA'S FUTURE IN PETROLEUM RESOURCES UNDER
THE OCEAN FLOOR 5-6 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NPC 1969]; NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL,
OCEAN PETROLEUM RESOURCES 30 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NPC 1975]; U.N. Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Mineral Resources of the Sea 7, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/125 (1970).
The latter report concluded that:
[T]he sedimentary section [of the ocean floor] is relatively thin, generally less than 1 or 2 km,
with very few reservoir beds of fine grained sands and with relatively little structure. Simi-
larly, the sediment fill of oceanic trenches is not known to be sufficiently thick to be of inter-
est. All evidence suggests that the abyssal open oceans are far less favorable than the
continental margins and small oceanic basins and there is little chance that petroleum occurs
over large areas of the abyssal plain. However, because of man's limited knowledge, no defi-
nite seaward limit for the existence of petroleum deposits can be inferred at this time and it is
not impossible that small portions of the abyssal floor and oceanic trenches may have some
potential.
48 NPC 1969, supra note 47.
49 rd
50 Id
51 Garcia-Mata, supra note 46.
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profitable. As time progresses, the more easily located onshore and
shallow water petroleum will be produced and consumed, thereby in-
creasing the importance of the potential petroleum supply of the deep
seabed. 2 Current predictions are that by the end of the century, most
of the world's hydrocarbons will come from fields beyond the 200 mile
limit of the EEZ.s3
2. Lack of technical capacity
The lack of sophisticated technology restrains the petroleum and
natural gas industry from engaging in extensive exploration and ex-
ploitation of the Area. But engineers are rapidly developing this tech-
nology. When negotiations began eight years ago, industry members
did not believe they would develop technology to find resources outside
the EEZ.5 4 Yet by March, 1975, the National Petroleum Council re-
52 NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, LAW OF THE SEA: PARTICULAR ASPECTS AFFECTING
THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1973) [hereinafter cited as NPC 1973].
53 Garcia-Mata, supra note 46.
54 Id In order to more fully understand the rapid expansion and increased sophistication, as
well as the prospects for future development, a review of technology utilized in off-shore produc-
tion, adapted from NPC 1975, supra note 47, follows.
Geological and Geophysical Surveys. Geological and geophysical surveys are conducted first
to identify areas favorable for the accumulation of hydrocarbons in the sedimentary deposits.
Since 1969, there have been many refinements in: (1) non-dynamite energy sources, seismic sur-
veying; (2) equipment used in tracking and recording reflected energy; and (3) equipment and
procedures used in processing the recorded energy by computers. These refinements have im-
proved the quality of available data used to determine possible locations of petroleum reservoirs,
while providing additional protection to the marine environment.
Also significant have been developments of specialized recording and processing devices
which have permitted the measurement of the relative amplitude of certain reflections. Some high
amplitude reflections, known as "bright spots," are associated with shallow gas accumulations.
Potentially, some of these accumulations are commercially exploitable. In general, oil accumula-
tions are usually not reliable generators of high amplitude reflections and further work is needed
to develop more efficient systems for targeting petroleum supplies.
Offshore Drilling and Production Technology. Exploratory wells must be drilled to determine
whether there is an accumulation of petroleum. Because the drilling equipment must be moved
frequently, equipment is mounted on a ship or some other movable structure. Once petroleum is
discovered, fixed platforms are set up to drill a number of development wells. Platforms, which
also serve as sites for the installation of production equipment, include drilling equipment, devices
to measure the amount of fluids produced, vessels to separate gas from the hydrocarbon fluids,
and treaters to remove water and impurities.
In order to explore and develop offshore petroleum deposits successfully, a means of accom-
plishing re-entry, for controlling well pressure and for assuring the return of mud or other fluids to
the drilling rig, is required. Re-entry, accomplished by sonar techniques, has been achieved in
water depths of about 6,243 meters. Control of pressure and return of drilling mud and other
fluids to the drilling rig can be accomplished through use of conventional devices in water depths
of about 350-400 meters. Controlling pressure and returning fluids is accomplished by a device
called a "riser," a tubular connection between the rig and the ocean floor. But as operations begin
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ported major advances. In 1981, a large oil and gas reservoir was
discovered off the Newfoundland coast just beyond the 200 mile zone.56
Wells are being drilled in increasingly greater water depths. The only
production systems which require further refinement are storage and
transportation systems.
In light of these rapid technological advances made since the
at greater depths, more buoyant sections are needed to reduce stress in the riser and in other parts
of the system. Recently, significant improvements have been made in the riser systems. One
system has a water depth capacity of more than 1,000 meters and another can be used in water
depths to 1,800 meters-there appear to be no obstacles to developing usable systems in any water
depth.
Important advances have occurred in equipment used in all phases of exploration and pro-
duction on the ocean floor. Blow-out preventors and control systems have been designed and
tested for use in water depths of about 3,000 meters. Improvements have been made in the posi-
tioning systems of mobile drilling vessels engaged in drilling exploratory wells, enabling them to
be used in water depths up to 1,000 meters. Dynamic positioning, which uses horizontal thrusters,
is now being used. This system permits continuous location of the drilling vessel without the use
of anchors in any water depth. Furthermore, it has been shown that these vessels can be dynami-
cally positioned in water deeper than 6,000 meters, which means that exploration of the deep
seabed is only limited by subsea equipment at the present time.
Drilling and production operations offshore are best accomplished through the use of a fixed
platform, but its use is currently limited by water depth and climatic conditions (the economic
feasibility of carrying on production changes as climatic conditions become more severe; see NPC
1975, supra note 47, at 28). In 1973, these platforms had not been installed in water depths ex-
ceeding 150 meters, yet an exploratory well already has been drilled eleven miles off the arctic
coast in 1,142 feet of water. Current technology demonstrates that fixed platforms can be em-
ployed at greater water depths than originally expected, and other types of production structures
are being designed and tested continually for use in greater water depths.
Another factor limiting current production in the deep seabed is the necessity of using human
divers or one atmosphere work chambers and hook-up installations on the seafloor. Deep sea
dives can now be made in water depths of about 450 meters, though they will soon be made in
depths to 600 meters. Ultimately dives as deep as 1,500 meters may be feasible. Additionally,
human divers may not be required in seafloor installations if one atmosphere work chambers and
remote control manipulators are developed.
Systems for seafloor production are also being adapted for use at greater depths. Use of
remote control operations and manipulation systems and one atmosphere submersibles are being
used at increasingly greater depths. Systems utilizing other techniques are continually being
tested and developed.
Probably the most difficult problems to resolve, before deep seabed petroleum exploration is
considered, are related to pipeline, storage, and transport capabilities. Submarine pipelines have
been successfully laid over distances of several hundred miles and techniques are being developed
for laying large diameter lines in 1,000 meters water depth. Further research is developing tech-
niques for laying pipes at increasingly greater depths.
55 NPC 1975, supra note 47. The Council noted the following developments:
drilling in water depths to 6,234 meters. One hole was reentered at a water depth of 3,939
meters. . . a third hole was drilled to 4,310 feet penetration below the seabed in 4,549 meters
water depth. Blowout prevention and control systems have been designed and tested for use
in water depths of about 3,000 meters ... . Ability to dynamically position drilling vessels
in waters deeper than 6,000 meters has been demonstrated. Water depth is therefore limited
only by subsea equipment.
56 Garcia-Mata, supra note 46.
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Treaty negotiations began, it seems reasonable that sufficiently sophis-
ticated technology for the exploitation of the deep seabed will be avail-
able before the negotiations are concluded, or shortly thereafter. Thus,
the lack of technical capacity does not support the exclusion of a re-
gime for petroleum exploitation in the Area from the Treaty.
3. Predictions of adequacy offuture supply
The extension of the EEZ to 200 nautical miles,57 within which the
majority of petroleum resources are thought to lie, coupled with poten-
tial onshore domestic resources, appears to provide substantial protec-
tion to the United States interest in ensuring sufficient supplies of
petroleum and natural gas.58 In fact, the petroleum industry has not
actively participated in treaty negotiations, and some industry experts
believe that the guarantee of a 200 mile EEZ, considered a valuable
concession, 59 may provide enough oil to meet future United States de-
mands for petroleum. It seems, though, that this concession does not
provide the protections and benefits that United States negotiators and
the petroleum industry expected.
Although domestic petroleum supplies were expected to play a sig-
nificant role in meeting the rising United States demand for crude oil,
the ratio of new domestic crude oil reserves to production on land has
steadily declined since 1950. Discoveries of domestic crude oil on land
have lagged since 1957, and domestic exploration has significantly de-
dined since 1969.60 Efforts to explore and exploit petroleum resources
have resulted in little success. For example, the overall success rate for
offshore drilling in the United States Gulf of Mexico from 1969 to 1973
averaged 12.5 percent.6 ' Since the Gulf is a proven oil province, it is
possible that untested areas will yield an even lower success rate.
62
57 Draft, supra note 7, art. 57.
58 It is estimated that 75-94% of United States petroleum resources are located shoreward of
200 nautical miles, though it is important to remember that: (1) neither the total amount of petro-
leum located under the oceans nor its location has been established, and (2) the amount to be
found and produced is even less certain. NPC 1975, supra note 47, at 16.
59 N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1981, § IV, at 1, col. 3.
60 NPC 1969, supra note 47.
61 NPC 1975, supra note 47, at 31.
62 I1d The United States Geological Survey estimated that the total amount of petroleum in
place in the United States (including the nation's continental shelflands to water depths of 600
feet) was originally two trillion barrels of crude oil and five quadrillion cubic feet of natural gas.
At the end of 1968, proven crude oil reserves totalled 30.7 million barrels, while natural piped gas
reserves were 287.3 trillion cubic feet. Ideally, the discovery of new reserves should exceed the
amount produced, thereby raising the amount of current proven reserves. Unfortunately, this has
not occurred in the United States. Exploratory drilling and new additions to reserves have pro-
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Administrative, Operational, and Funding System of the
International Seabed Authority
The administrative, operational, and funding framework of the In-
gressively diminished. By the end of 1968, proven petroleum reserves declined sharply compared
to other years: crude oil reserves dropped 670 million barrels in two years, and natural gas
reserves were at a 5.6 trillion cubic foot deficit. NPC 1969, supra note 47. To offset this trend, new
reserves of petroleum resources must be discovered. The question that remains is where they will
be found.
The easy oil in the United States has already been discovered. Most petroleum resources that
may be located on land probably lie in deeply buried geological structures extending 20,000 feet or
more below the surface. Although these depths can be reached technologically, there is little in-
centive to develop these areas because of the enormous expense and low expected yield. Id at 8.
For example, in 1967, thirty-four wells were drilled below 20,000 feet at a cost somewhere between
one and 2.5 million dollars per well. Based on such high costs, it is estimated that, to be profitable,
a petroleum deposit located at 20,000 feet below the surface would have to be many times larger
than one located at 5,000 feet. It is unlikely that such large deposits will be found at any depth.
Data published by the American Association of Petroleum Geologists show that since World War
II, the size of the average land field discovered has grown steadily smaller, that the number of
commercially successful fields has dropped by 40%, and that the number of wells deemed unprof-
itable and abandoned in less than a year of operation has almost doubled. Id at 8-9. Alaska and
the arctic slope have become important new sources of new petroleum reserves and have shown
potential. Unfortunately, best available estimates indicate that despite this new supply, domestic
onshore petroleum discoveries and production will be unable to respond to growing United States
demands. Id at 9.
If present estimates of the amounts of petroleum and natural gas located in the nation's conti-
nental shelf are accurate, the supply will last from eight to one hundred years. Nigrelli, supra note
45, at 163 (this prediction was based on the 1973 United States resource consumption rate which
subsequently increased). If production rates were at 1973 levels, the supply was predicted to last
137 years. However, if offshore productivity doubles in relation to onshore production rates, the
oil supply within 200 nautical miles is expected to last until 1997, assuming the production rate
keeps pace with the United States demand. Id
Natural gas conditions are similar to the petroleum situation, except that the natural gas
supply on the United States continental shelf is greater. Id at 48. If all natural gas production
were shifted offshore this year, the United States supply of natural gas within 200 miles would last
until 1995, provided the increase in demand stayed at six percent per year and the wells produced
534.6 trillion cubic feet. Id at 164. Offshore gas now supplies only about four percent of the
United States demand: the remainder is satisfied by its huge land-based gas reserves. Because of
substantial land reserves, it appears unlikely that the United States will need to exploit gas beyond
the 200 mile limit for some time. At current production rates, and assuming a six percent yearly
increase in offshore production, the supply within 200 nautical miles may serve the United States
until 2020. Id However, oil and gas deposits often commingle. Thus, the United States will
explore gas deposits further offshore than at present in conjunction with its search for oil deposits.
For examples of commingled discoveries, see Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1981, at 23, col. 4; Wall St. J.,
Mar. 13, 1981, at 8, col. 5; Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1981, at 8, col. 3.
An additional difficulty faces the petroleum industry even if it continues solely to exploit
petroleum resources on the continental shelf. The Treaty does not define clearly where the conti-
nental shelf ends. Thus, which nation has the right to exploit resources beyond the EEZ is un-
clear. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, § V, at 5, col. 1. Since the continental margins, where larger
deposits of petroleum are believed to exist, often extend beyond 200 miles, the Treaty may pro-
hibit full exploitation of these areas by placing onerous burdens on the developers. If the defini-
tion of "continental shelf' is construed narrowly, as advocated by the developing countries,
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ternational Seabed Authority (Authority) will have a direct bearing on
access and the cost of access to petroleum resources. The major barrier
to future development of these resources is economic rather than tech-
nological,63 and systems that place heavy financial burdens on private
industries seeking to recover petroleum resources under the ocean may
effectively prevent such recovery. In addition, those in private industry
seek guaranteed access to ocean deposits before they expend substantial
capital developing complex equipment and exploring ocean surfaces.64
The present systems of the Authority, contained in the negotiating text
of the Treaty, fail to resolve either of these concerns. A brief review of
these systems will show that access to sites is by no means assured due
to the political nature of the Authority, and heavy financial burdens are
placed on those seeking to exploit the ocean floor,65 potentially depriv-
ing private industry of the opportunity to earn a fair return on
investments.66
1. The administrative organization of the International Seabed
Authority
The Authority67 is divided into four major organs:68 the Assem-
bly, the Council, the Secretariat, and the Enterprise. The Assembly
and the Council, the chief decision-making bodies of the Authority
which have the greatest impact on access and cost of access to the
ocean's resources, will be discussed in this section. Since the Secreta-
riat's function is unrelated to the question of access, it will not be dis-
cussed. The Enterprise, the operating arm of the Authority, will be
discussed in the next section.
The Assembly, the supreme organ of the Authority,69 is composed
of one representative from every nation party to the Treaty.70 This
body is responsible for establishing the general policies of the Author-
United States developers may be prevented from drilling off the United States coast where the
continental shelf extends beyond 200 miles. The limit of the continental shelf must be legally
clarified to include the continental margin and slope, even if they extend beyond the EEZ, for
United States interests to be sufficiently protected.
63 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
64 The nodule mining industry is currently grappling with this problem. Non-assurance of
exclusive access to any particular site has created difficulties raising necessary capital and getting
approval by the boards of directors within the industry. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1981, § V, at 1, col. 3.
65 See infra notes 109-118 and accompanying text.
66 Opportunity to earn a fair return is the sole impetus for the industry to exploit these re-
sources. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 44.
67 Draft, supra note 7, art. 1(2).
68 Id art. 158(1).
69 Id art. 160(1).
70 Id art. 159(1).
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ity, amending the Treaty, and approving policies, rules, and regulations
developed by the Commission for the operation of the Authority.7
Each member of this body is entitled to only one vote.72 Thus, it is
obvious that the United States and other developed countries, who
have the greatest stake in seabed exploitation since they are the only
countries with sufficient capital and technology to undertake this type
of venture, will be substantially out-numbered and out-voted.
The Council has power to approve or disapprove applications for
Area sites,73 and is comprised of 36 members representing various
political and economic interests.74 The Draft provides specific criteria
for the election of the Council's membership, and these provisions will
not assure the United States a seat.75 Initially, a Preparatory Commis-
sion will promulgate rules and regulations governing access to Area
sites.7 6 Once the Treaty has been ratified and the Authority is operat-
ing, however, these rules and regulations may be amended and applica-
tions for sites may be approved by consensus of the Council.77 Thus,
rules and regulations unfavorable to the United States could be en-
acted. Since the United States is not assured a seat on the Council, it is
conceivable that private United States companies may have their plans
rejected.
71 Id art. 132.
72 Id art. 159.
73 Id art. 162.
74 Id art. 161.
75 id art. 161(1). Article 161(1) provides:
(a) Four members from among the eight States Parties which have the largest invest-
ments in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in the Area, either directly or
through their nationals, including at least one State from the Eastern (Socialist) European
region;
(b) Four members from among those States Parties which, during the last five years for
which statistics are available, have either consumed more than two percent of total world
consumption or have had net imports of more than two percent of total world imports of the
commodities produced from the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, and in
any case one State from the Eastern (Socialist) European region;
(c) Four members from among countries which on the basis of production in areas
under their jurisdiction are major net exporters of the categories of minerals to be derived
from the Area, including at least two developing countries whose exports of such minerals
have a substantial bearing upon their economies;
(d) Six members from among developing States, representing special interests to be
represented shall include those of States with large populations, States which are major im-
porters of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, States which are potential
producers of such minerals, and least developed States;
(e) Eighteen members elected according to the principle of ensuring an equitable geo-
graphical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole, provided that each geographical
region shall have at least one member elected under this subparagraph for this purpose the
geographical regions shall be Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe (Socialist), Latin America and
Western Europe and others.
"States Parties," as used in the Treaty, are those states who have signed the Treaty.
76 Richardson, supra note 44, at 63.
77 Id
Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea
4:172(1982)
Prerequisite criteria to obtain access to a site are listed in Annex
III of the Treaty.7" An applicant must have a state party sponsor and
must satisfy financial and technical qualifications. The Legal and
Technical Commission, an arm of the Council, makes the initial deter-
uination whether the applicant and his plan of work comply with the
specified criteria. 79 There is no guarantee that a United States repre-
sentative will serve on this Commission or, in fact, that any representa-
tive will be from a developed country-the Commission may be
composed entirely of representatives from the developing and socialist
countries since the Council, itself dominated numerically by these
countries, will designate the Commission members. Any Commission
decision will be deemed approved by the Council within a fixed time,
unless the Council reverses the decision by consensus.80 Thus, if the
Commission disapproves a United States company's application, there
may be no available recourse for the frustrated applicant.8 ' If regula-
tions favoring the developing countries are passed-a likely event-an
applicant from a developed country may be unable to obtain an Area
site.
Under the current administrative system, developing and socialist
countries substantially out-number and out-vote the United States and
other non-socialist countries. The non-socialist countries can neither
prevent the approval of applications from an unqualified developing or
socialist country, nor can they secure approval of qualified developed
countries' applications. In addition, they would be unable to prevent
the Council's adoption of rules and regulations failing to consider the
legitimate interests of the United States and other developed countries.
78 Draft, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 7.
79 Richardson, supra note 44, at 62. The Commission will consist of 15 members elected to
five year terms by a three-fourths vote of the Council. Id
80 Id
81 Some commentators suggest that a check has been placed on the amount of discretion exer-
cised by the Council and the Commission in accepting or rejecting applications by making the
Seabed Disputes Chamber available to applicants. See, e.g., id However, if the Council and the
Commission act in conformity with the rules and regulations they promulgate, the Seabeds Dis-
pute Chamber cannot overrule their determination. Article 190 provides that:
[T]he Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber shall not pronounce itself on the question of whether any
rules, regulations or procedures adopted by the Authority are in conformity with the provi-
sions of this Convention, nor declare any such rule, regulation or procedure invalid. Its juris-
diction shall be confined to determine whether the application of any rules, regulations, or
procedures to individual cases would be in conflict with the contractual and conventional
obligations to the parties to the dispute, and to claims concerning lack of competence or
misuse of power.
Draft, supra note 7, art. 190.
185
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2. The operational system of the Authority
Along with granting licenses to exploit ocean resources, the Au-
thority will recover these resources through its operating arm, the En-
terprise.82 The Enterprise will develop Area sites discovered for it by
other developers,8 3 and the resources recovered through the activities
and the revenues it receives will be transferred to developing nations
and "people who have not gained full independence. 84
The present operating system of the Enterprise delineated in the
Treaty is inequitable. Even though it will directly compete with private
and state producers, the Enterprise enjoys several advantages:
(1) favorable funding and tax treatment;85 (2) revenue-sharing provi-
sions;86 (3) the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and other con-
ditions imposed on mining operators;87 (4) the reservation of sites by
private and state producers for the Enterprise;88 (5) the quota system;89
(6) the review conference; 90 and (7) institutional bias.91
The Enterprise will receive funds from various sources. The
United States has agreed to a system devised by developing countries
whereby the Enterprise will begin operations shortly after the Treaty
becomes effective. 92 This system may not have an adverse competitive
impact on state owned or subsidized operations, but the system may
create a competitive advantage for the Enterprise over private opera-
tors who need time to find willing investors and creditors. In fact, rais-
ing risk capital has already proved difficult for private companies who
are ready to mine the ocean floor for nodules.
93
Under the present text, the Enterprise enjoys tax-free status, 94 de-
82 Id 158(2).
83 Id Annex III, art. 8.
84 "People who have not gained full independence" refers to groups like the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO). Lilla, supra note 28.
85 Draft, supra note 7, art. 183 and Annex IV, art. 13(5).
86 Id Annex III, art. 13.
87 Id arts. 245-57.
88 Id Annex III, art. 8.
89 Id art. 151(2)(b).
90 Id art. 155.
91 See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
92 Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Report by Mr. P.B. Engo, Chairman of the
First Committee on the Work of the Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L.16 (1976), reprinted in
6 Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea Official Records 130, 133, U.N. Sales No.
E.77.V.2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Engo Report]. The proposed system consists of subscriptions,
state loan guarantees, voluntary contributions, and funds obtained from revenue sharing.
93 N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1981, § IV, at 1, col. 3 (executive of mining company termed deep
seabed ventures "not bankable").
94 Draft, supra note 7, art. 183 and Annex IV, art. 13(5).
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spite United States objections. This places private industry at a serious
economic disadvantage, as it is subject to double taxation-first, by the
Authority itself, and, second, by the sponsoring state95 -which may
prevent profitable private exploration. The Enterprise, on the other
hand, is free to retain and distribute all profits from its ventures to de-
veloping countries, to reinvest profits in additional equipment or sites,
or any combination thereof. Additionally, provisions for mandatory
transfer of technology allow the Enterprise to gain sophisticated tech-
nology from operators in the Area at less than commercial value.96 It
may receive proven technology without engaging in long and costly re-
search and development, thus increasing the profitability of its
exploration.
The site reservation system97 provides the Enterprise with a min-
ing site already explored by state and private industries. Consequently,
the Enterprise would not have to expend the large amounts of money
and time that exploration requires. Private industry, on the other hand,
must continually expend vast sums to explore the ocean floor, not only
for its own benefit, but also because it is required to find an additional
site for the Enterprise to exploit. This benefits the Enterprise and,
through it, the developing countries.
The production quota98 and the review conference99 may also af-
ford the Enterprise advantages over private and state producers. It
seems unlikely that the Enterprise would be subject to a quota system
or that its privilege to exploit a site would be revoked. Private industry,
on the other hand, may feel compelled to recapture its entire initial
investment in one operation because of the possibility that any future
operations will be limited or denied entirely."°°
95 The maximum corporate tax rate in the United States is 46%. 26 U.S.C.A. § 11(Ib) (West
Supp. 1982). United States industry will also be subject to the Authority's tax as it will be exploit-
ing resources beyond the EEZ. Draft, supra note 7, Annex IV. In fact, the "revenue sharing"
provisions were drafted to cover the development of both petroleum resources and manganese
nodules. Nigrelli, supra note 45, at 174.
96 See infra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
97 Draft, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 8. The United States delegation originally refused to
provide the Enterprise with explored sites but now has acquiesed to this provision.
98 Id art. 151(2)(b). Additionally, Article 151(3) gives the Authority:
power to limit the level of production of minerals from the Area, other than the minerals
from nodules, under such conditions and applying such methods as may be appropriate.
Regulations adopted by the Authority pursuant to this provision will be subject to the proce-
dures [determined by amendment to the Convention].
Id
99 .d art. 155. The Conference would be held 15 years after the date the treaty becomes
effective.
100 Breaux, The Diminishing Prospects for anAcceptable Law of the Sea Treaty, 19 VA. J. INT'L
L. 257, 283 (1979).
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Since the Enterprise is part of the Authority, it is reasonable to
expect that there will be an institutional bias in favor of the Enterprise.
The Treaty itself requires the Authority to favor the developing coun-
tries.101 Since the Enterprise represents the developing countries, such
discrimination arguably will favor the Enterprise itself. Because the
Commission, the Council, and the Assembly have discretionary power
to approve applications for mine sites,I°2 this bias could substantially
affect other operators' efforts to obtain sites.'0 3
3. The funding system of the International Seabed Authority
Under the present draft, the Authority may raise its own revenue
and avoid dependency on United Nations members for support.
104
The Authority is empowered to raise revenue by charging a $500,000
application fee,10 5 a "ground rent"'0 6 of $1 million per year until pro-
duction begins, and production payments.0 7 The Authority can also
raise revenue through taxation'08 (also deemed revenue sharing).
These methods place heavy financial burdens on private industry and
should be substantially revised. The Authority's ability to raise funds,
coupled with its ability to exploit areas discovered by others, will make
the Authority a wealthy international organization controlled by devel-
oping countries.'0 9
The most serious impediments to private development of ocean
resources are the Treaty's production charges and revenue sharing pro-
visions. These provisions apply to all exploitation activities occurring
beyond the 200 mile EEZ 010 and in the deep seabed. Thus, the United
States, one of the few countries with available technology and a conti-
nental shelf beyond 200 miles, will be one of the few countries bur-
dened by this provision."'I Nonetheless, the United States, at the
beginning of the negotiations, formally accepted the principle of reve-
101 See Draft, supra note 7, art. 82 (developing countries not obligated to pay royalties).
102 See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
103 This would be particularly true as sites become scarce.
104 Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 22, col. 1; Safire, supra note 29.
105 Draft, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 13.
106 Id See also Richardson, supra note 44, at 62. Although this sum is creditable against the
tax payments once production begins, it may impede private industry's ability to raise sufficient
capital to begin ocean exploration.
107 Id
108 Id
109 Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 22, col. 1; Safire, supra note 29.
110 Draft, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 13.
111 Id art. 82. Article 82 requires "[t]he coastal State [to] make payments or contributions in
kind in respect to the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
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nue sharing by state and private companies for the benefit of the devel-
oping countries.11 2 In 1975, the United States proposed a system that
placed a five percent ceiling on the amount subject to revenue shar-
ing.11 3 In 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger informed the Conference
that the United States would agree to a method of financing the Enter-
prise, so that it could begin the mining operations at essentially the
same time as state and private industries." 4 But the developing coun-
tries sought large contributions from developers so that production
profits would be minimal."' The position of the developing countries
has largely been accepted by the delegates, and the percentage of reve-
nue sharing is higher than the original United States proposal.
1 6
Although there are no explicit provisions on revenue sharing from
112 Breaux, supra note 100, at 275; see also Draft United Nations Convention on the Interna-
tional Sea-bed Area: Working Paper Submitted by the United States of America 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 21), art. 5(2), at 133, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970).
113 This proposal was included in an earlier negotiating text, the Third U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negotiating Text, art. 82, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WPO
(1977), reprintedin 8 Third U.N. Conference of the Law of the Sea Official Records at 1, 17, U.N.
Sales No. E.78.74 (1978). The United States delegation:
indicated that if [it was] assumed [that] a given field would produce 700 million barrels of oil
through a 20 year depletion period, and value of $11 per barrel, the total amount would be
$140 million per field (total revenue collected over the first 15 years of a 20 year depletion
period). The oil and other minerals themselves, and revenues collected by the coastal states
would of course remain with the coastal state.
Status Report on the Law of the Sea Conference-Part 3: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular A4ffairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1217, 1233 (1975) (United States Delegation
Report).
114 Engo Report, supra note 92, at 133.
115 See Breaux, supra note 100, at 263. The viewpoints of the developed and the developing
countries conflict. The developing countries find the notion of profit to be incompatible with the
principle of the common heritage of mankind. I Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
Official Records (37th mtg.) at 157, U.N. Sales No. E.75.V.3 (1975) (statement by Mr. Bakula of
Peru). Profit will be accepted only to the extent necessary to ensure that ocean mining will com-
mence, at least until the Enterprise is operationally and financially independent of the developed
countries.
116 Current production (royalty payments) and profit share payments are recovered in stages-
the first before the investment is recovered and the second afterward.
In the first stage, the production charge is 2% of market value of the processed metals pro-
duced by the project. In the second stage, it increases to 4% unless the return on investment
in a given year would fall below 15% if the 4% rate were applied, in which case the produc-
tion charge reverts to 2% for the year. The profit-sharing payments are based on a graduated,
incremental schedule. During the first stage, the rates are 35% for that income providing a
return on investment of 10% or less, 42.5% for that income providing a return between 10%
and 20% and 50% for that income providing a return in excess of 20%. In the second stage,
the corresponding rates are 40%, 50% and 70%.
Richardson, supra note 44, at 62; Draft, supra note 7, at Annex III, art. 13 (the production charge
applies to all proceeds while the profit share payments (i.e., taxes) apply only to the actual fraction
attributable to the mining portion of the project). The calculations utilized are based on a com-
puter model which merely provides a base-case for a hypothetical mining operation. If the as-
sumptions are overly optimistic, the levels of payment will be excessively high, thereby possibly
preventing private operators from obtaining access to these resources. This particularly would be
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petroleum resources derived from the deep seabed, it is likely that the
provisions established for mining nodules would be applied mutalls mu-
tandis,"17 thus imposing the very same financial burdens on the petro-
leum industry. The developing countries' position on the burdens
placed on the petroleum industry has eased somewhat," 8 but the appli-
cation fees, the "ground rents," the production payments, and the reve-
nue sharing provisions advocated by the developing countries still
place unfair burdens on the United States petroleum industry engaged
in resource exploitation beyond the 200 mile EEZ.
Provisions for the Transfer of Technology
Article Five of Annex 111119 requires mandatory transfer of all
technological information and equipment utilized in deep seabed ex-
ploitation to the Enterprise and developing countries. 120 If the operator
does not own the rights to the technology, he must provide assurances
from the owner that the technology will be made available to the Enter-
prise. 12 1 Furthermore, if the Enterprise cannot obtain the technology
on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, operators in
the Area having access to the technology must ensure Enterprise
access. '
22
These provisions have been the subject of intense negotiations due
to the conflicting views of the developing and developed countries.'
23
Representatives of developing countries argue that mandatory transfer
is essential: without it, they fear they will be precluded from participat-
ing in deep seabed activities and that the Enterprise would never be-
come functional.'2 4  The developed countries originally opposed
true for United States operators since they would not receive state subsidies reducing the financial
burden. See Breaux, supra note 100, at 283.
117 For a discussion of the potential precedential effect of this treaty, see Breaux, supra note
100, at 260-62.
118 This is probably due to the recognition that the amount of resources available from the
deep seabed is substantially less than originally expected and that deep seabed exploitation is a
risky and expensive technical enterprise. Id at 276.
119 This article does not specifically refer to the production of nodules, and therefore seems
applicable to technology used by the petroleum industry as well as the nodule mining industry.
120 Draft, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 5.
121 Id Annex III, art. 5(3)(b). If such assurance is not obtained, the technology cannot be used
by anyone engaged in exploitation activities in the Area. Id
122 Id Annex III, art. 5(5).
123 For an example of the viewpoint of the United States delegation, see Third U.N. Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, Report By the Chairman of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. C.3/
Rep. 1, Annex I (Informal Proposal by the United States), reprinted in 10 Third U.N. Conference
on the Law of the Sea Official Records at 190, U.N. Sales No. E.79.V.4 (1979).
124 Their stance conforms to the program of the developing countries for overall economic
development. Breaux, supra note 100, at 263. See also R. ANAND, supra note 1, at 249-51.
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mandatory transfer, contending that the technology would be available
to the Enterprise and the developing countries through normal market
operations. The United States later acquiesed to mandatory transfer to
the Enterprise, but not to the developing countries. However, the
United States now seems to have agreed to mandatory transfer to both
the Enterprise and to the developing countries.1 25 Spokesmen for the
United States delegation maintain that their acquiescence will not ad-
versely affect commerce or technological development, or mandate fu-
ture technological transfers.
126
The United States delegation's position lacks merit. Since a forced
sale will not be the result of the type of free negotiations characteristic
of most commercial transactions, it is unlikely that the resulting terms
will be commercially fair and reasonable. It is also unlikely that tech-
nological innovations will be protected from theft or other misuse
under such a system-there is no provision in the Treaty preventing the
Enterprise or the transferee country from passing on the technology to
another nation or organization. 127 Further, there is no basis for the
United States delegation's belief that this regime will be applicable
solely to the deep seabed.' 28 In fact, many commentators oppose the
treaty because they perceive an adverse precedential effect on future
international negotiations. 29 Although it is presently unclear whether
these provisions will apply to the petroleum industry, as well as to the
mining industry, it seems likely that they will. 3 The importance of
the provisions to the developing countries, who have played a domi-
nant role in the negotiations thus far, is evident.
The provisions conflict with the United States theory of free enter-
prise and should not be established as a legal precedent. The United
States petroleum industry has always been privately run, so that com-
panies are free to develop their own technology to be used for their
own benefits. Of course, private companies at times have found it prof-
itable to share their developments with others. But it is the business
judgment of the company that motivates these decisions. The Treaty,
125 Draft, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 5(3)(c).
126 See Breaux, supra note I00, at 263.
127 For a more extensive discussion of this problem, see Breaux, supra note 100, at 264-65. This
lack of protection may discourage the industry from continued development of deep seabed
technology.
128 Id at 264.
129 d at 260-62; Goldie, supra note 14, at 295; Knight, Time Has Bypassed Law of the Sea
Talks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1981, at 22, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, § IV, at 5, col. I (inter-
view with Senator Breaux); Lilla, supra note 28.
130 As noted earlier, Annex III, Article 5 of the Draft does not refer exclusively to the produc-
tion of nodules. See supra note 119.
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which embodies binding international law, will make this transfer
mandatory for anyone exploring or exploiting ocean resources beyond
the 200 mile EEZ.'3 ' The potential drain on the commercial profits of
the companies who expend vast sums of money developing this tech-
nology renders this approach a dangerous precedent for international
law.
Marine Scientic Research
Scientific research on the continental margin and the floor of the
deep seabed began but a short time ago,132 and little information is,
therefore, available. Because of the need for more data, the provisions
covering marine scientific research were also hotly debated.'33 Many
aspects of the regime were unacceptable to the United States delega-
tion,' 34 and as with most provisions of the Treaty relating to explora-
tion and exploitation of the ocean's resources, the views of the
developed countries conflicted with those of the developing countries.
The developing coastal states argue that establishing EEZs includes the
right to regulate marine scientific research therein. The coastal state,
therefore, would have to consent to any research conducted in its EEZ.
Since developed countries fear that a consent requirement or restric-
tions imposed by the coastal state may hamper progress in marine sci-
ence, they argue against the imposition of a consent requirement.
The notion of consent by the coastal state included in the Draft'35
attempts to balance the opposing interests of the developed and the
developing countries. For example, Paragraph Three of Article 246
provides that consent "shall, in normal circumstances" be granted
when the proposed research project is carried out "exclusively for
peaceful purposes and in order to increase scientific knowledge of the
marine environment for the benefit of all mankind." 13 6 But Paragraph
Five does give the coastal state discretion to withhold consent under
certain circumstances.' 37 With ultimate discretion vested in the coastal
131 Draft, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 5.
132 In the late 1950s there were only three or four countries with offshore oil interests. Now
exploration of the coasts of more than 75 countries is in progress and drilling has begun off 42 of
them. R. ANAND, supra note 1, at 19.
133 See, e.g., 4 Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea Official Records (22d mtg.) at 105,
U.N. Sales No. E.75.V.10 (1975) (Statement of Mr. Clingan); 9 Third U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea Official Records (101st mtg.) at 56, U.N. Sales No. E.79.V.3 (1980) (Statement of
Mr. Oxman).
134 E.g., Draft, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 5.
135 Id arts. 238-65. See especially id. art. 246.
136 Id art. 246(3).
137 Id art. 246(5)(a), (b), (c). Paragraph 5 of Article 246 gives coastal states discretion to
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state, the balance seems to favor the developing nations.
Even beyond the notion of consent, there is a severe division over
the terms of the regime for marine scientific research. The developed
countries, private academic institutions, and private business organiza-
tions are opposed to sharing information obtained by them at enor-
mous expense without any quid pro quo from the developing
countries. 3 On the other hand, the developing countries, particularly
the coastal states, do not want to be uninformed and uninvolved while
foreign countries or corporations engage in research projects off their
shores. 139
The current Draft provisions on research in the EEZ and on the
continental shelf favor the position of the developing countries.140 The
coastal state has the discretion to prohibit research in EEZ and on its
continental shelf.14 1 If consent is granted, the researchers (who are usu-
ally from developed countries) must: (1) assume the financial burden
of the project; (2) provide the coastal state with a full description of the
study six months before research begins;' 42 (3) allow coastal state par-
ticipation in the project; 43 (4) allow the coastal state full access to all
data and samples obtained;144 (5) make all research results internation-
ally available as soon as possible; 145 and (6) allow neighboring land-
withhold their consent to the conduct of a marine scientific research project of another State
or competent international organization in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental
shelf of the coastal state if that project: (a) is of direct significance for the exploration and
exploitation of natural resources, whether living or non-living; (b) involves drilling into the
continental shelf, the use of explosives or the introduction of harmful substances into the
marine environment; (c) involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, in-
stallations and structures.
The negotiators appear to distinguish between "fundamental" or "pure" research, and "ap-
plied," "commercial," or "military" research. Realistically, this standard may be difficult to ap-
ply. Much of the geological research is commercially useful to the oil and gas industry, and
marine biological research is useful to the fishing industry. R. ANAND, supra note I, at 102.
138 Research information is generally exchanged for other information or kept private, not
given away.
139 R. ANAND, supra note 1, at 102.
140 Restrictions and burdens placed on marine scientific research in the EEZ are contained in
Articles 246, 247, 249 and 254. Draft, supra note 7. The restrictions placed on scientific research
in the EEZ and on the continental shelf are likely to cause opposition to the ratification of the
Treaty by the United States scientific community. Some influential United States scientists main-
tain that they would be better off negotiating access to the EEZs of other countries on a strictly
bilateral basis. Others, however, believe that the existence of the negotiating texts has set the
pattern for unilateral legislation and bilateral negotiation, and therefore feel that the Treaty would
not cause any major additional difficulties. Breaux, supra note 100, at 286.
141 Draft, supra note 7, art. 246(5)(a).
142 Id art. 248.
143 Id arL 249.
144 Id art. 249(c).
145 Id
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locked and geographically disadvantaged states to participate in the
project.
146
The positions of the developed and developing countries on
marine scientific research in the Area also conflict. The developing
countries argue that the Authority should have the exclusive right to
conduct such research. This stance reflects a departure from prior ex-
pressions of international law concerning the freedom of seas.1 47 This
traditional doctrine, advocated by the developed countries, has been
accepted by the delegates to UNCLOS 111.148
The importance of marine scientific research to the petroleum in-
dustry is clear. In order to discover oil, tests of the ocean's floors must
be conducted and test wells must be drilled. 149  Although private re-
searchers would remain free to explore the deep seabed, any research
conducted in the EEZ or on the continental shelf would be greatly re-
stricted by the Treaty. This is especially disturbing because the Treaty
has not delineated clearly the boundaries of the continental shelf.'5
This provision would not only place the entire financial burden of the
research on the petroleum industry, but, like the provision requiring
transfer of technology, would require massive transfers of knowledge to
the developing countries. These provisions hardly seem fair and rea-
sonable,':5 and certainly are not compatible with the United States free
enterprise system. Thus, it is unlikely that the United States would ac-
cept them.
Lack of Grandfather Rights and Security of Tenure
The United States repeatedly asserts that protection must be af-
forded to those who begin operation prior to the Treaty's effective
date.'52 The developing countries, on the other hand, continue to resist
the inclusion of grandfather rights and condemn states and private in-
146 Id art. 254(3).
147 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 480
U.N.T.S. 82. This Convention codifies the doctrine of the freedom of the seas originally advo-
cated by Grotius.
148 Draft, supra note 7, art. 256. Article 256 provides, in relevant part that "[a]ll states. . . as
well as competent international organizations, have the right, in conformity with the provisions of
Part XI, to conduct marine scientific research in the Area."
149 Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1981, at 8, col. 5; Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1981, at 8, col. 4.
150 N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, § IV, at 5, col. 1 (Elliot Richardson interview). Does the conti-
nental shelf include the continental margin?-the continental slope? The answers to these ques-
tions may become particularly important since large oil deposits recently were found in the
continental margins which may prove to be a fruitful source of oil. Garcia-Mata, supra note 46.
151 Richardson, supra note 44, at 61.
152 The industry feels that security of tenure, often referred to as grandfather rights, is abso-
lutely necessary for ocean mining. Breaux, supra note 100, at 282.
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dustries that have already begun ocean mining.'53 The present Draft of
the Treaty reflects the position of the developing countries and, in ef-
fect, calls for a moratorium on the development of non-metallic re-
sources in the deep seabed.
It appears that the Treaty will not be ratified in the near future.'
54
Yet, the petroleum industry is already recovering petroleum deposits
from beyond the 200 mile EEZ.155 If further exploration and exploita-
tion is to be undertaken, some protection must be afforded to the wells
discovered or the industry may not be able to raise sufficient capital to
continue exploration.' 56 Although the United States may pass its own
legislation allowing the industry to continue developing the ocean's re-
sources beyond the EEZ, and may enter into individual treaties with
other nations that also have the technology available to carry out such
exploitation, this alone may not provide sufficient protection. 57  To
153 See 9 Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea Official Records (109th mtg.) at 103-04,
U.N. Sales No. E.79.V.3 (1980) (statement of Mr. Nandan of Fiji) [hereinafter cited as Nandan
Statement]. The developing countries are opposed to including grandfather rights because those
operations would only be subject to conditions imposed in the original contract, rather than condi-
tions reflecting policies of the developing countries. Breaux, supra note 100, at 282.
154 The Reagan Administration has not completed its review of the Treaty. Thus, no substan-
tive negotiations can be concluded. In addition, changes proposed by the Administration proba-
bly will cause heated debate.
155 Garcia-Mata, supra note 46.
156 This problem has already been encountered by the mining industry. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7,
1981, § IV, at 1, col. 3.
157 Under the traditional freedom of the seas principle, the United States cannot claim exclu-
sive legal rights to any area of the seabed necessary to support its large investments and provide
the security of tenure of Area sites. Stevenson, Don't Scuttle the Sea Law; Improve Its Draft, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 10, 1981, at 30, col. 4.
Developers of Area sites must have an exclusive legal right to exploit that site. Unlike fish,
the petroleum resources contemplated by the scriveners of the Convention on the High Seas, supra
note 147, cannot swim. According to Elliot Richardson,
No nation can confer a right to [develop Area sites] which is enforceable against the nationals
of any other country. Indeed, the position that [such explorations] is a high-seas freedom
cannot be squared with the assertion of any such power.
In our view [i.e., the United States], however, nations can license their own nationals to
mine the deep seabed and can reciprocally agree to respect the licenses granted by other
nations. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany... have each enacted
legislation that would authorize such reciprocal licensing, not as an alternative to the Law of
the Sea convention but to foster the continued development of seabed mining capability. It is
likely that several other advanced industrial countries will in due course follow suit. The
number of these countries, however, is not likely in the foreseeable future to exceed six or
eight. Can they collectively provide sufficient security for seabed mining investment? This in
itself is a question of some difficulty. The fact that there have been threats of reprisal is not,
of course, dispositive: We have no way of knowing whether or not such threats would in fact
be carried out or, if they were, what damage they might inflict. That there would be legal
challenges to any claims purporting to rest on national legislation is certain: only the out-
come is in doubt.
The only sure way of removing these threats and uncertainties, quite obviously, is
through the establishment of a universally recognized international legal regime for the ex-
ploitation of deep seabed minerals.
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protect the huge investment required for offshore exploitation, the pri-
vate industry needs universally accepted rights to exploit a particular
area in the seabed.'58 Since wells stand in place for an extended period
of time, the Treaty should contain some guarantee that wells discov-
ered prior to its ratification will be the discoverer's property.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The petroleum resources of the deep seabed would clearly fall
under the Authority's jurisdiction. 5 9 The present Draft of UNCLOS
III imposes a moratorium on the development of resources until a re-
gime for their exploitation is developed by amendment to the Treaty.
160
This moratorium, which may last for a long time since the Reagan Ad-
ministration has halted further negotiations, could adversely affect the
interests of the United States and the private petroleum industry,' 6 '
which already has begun drilling offshore beyond the 200 mile EEZ.
The lack of a clear regime for the development of petroleum re-
sources in the Area cannot continue. The potential supply, even if rela-
tively small, may ultimately prove necessary and valuable to the
United States.162 In light of the rapid advances in offshore exploration
and exploitation technology, development of the ocean floor may begin
in the near future. If domestic and shallow offshore supplies prove less
promising than originally anticipated, and the offshore finds are sub-
Richardson, supra note 44, at 61. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, § IV, at 5, col. I (Elliot
Richardson interview); Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 23, col. 1 (letter to the editor from Elliot
Richardson).
158 Richardson, supra note 44, at 61.
159 This conclusion arises from Article 133(b)(1) of the Draft ("[l]iquid or gaseous substances at
or beneath the surface such as petroleum [and natural] gas" are considered mineral resources in
the Area), read in conjunction with Article 134(5) ("[a]ctivities in the Area shall be governed by
the provisions of this Part"), Article 136 ("The Area and its resources are the common heritage of
mankind"), Article 137 (precluding exercise of claims of sovereignty in the Area and vesting the
rights in the Area's resources in mankind as a whole), and Article 151(3) (giving the Authority
power to limit production in the Area). Draft, supra note 7. Other provisions in Part XI relating
to the Area also support this conclusion. Id arts. 133-55.
160 Id art. 151(2). Earlier texts, which reflected the position of the developing countries, pro-
vided that resources not contained in manganese nodules would not be developed until the Coun-
cil promulgated rules and regulations. The United States delegation feels that the present draft is
a significant improvement. Breaux, supra note 100, at 281.
161 Presumably, these amendments would not be considered until the fifteen-year review con-
ference provided for in Article 155. In light of the difficulty in reaching agreement on the regime
for deep seabed mining of nodules, it seems reasonable to conclude that establishing a regime for
the exploitation of petroleum resources would consume an equally long time, thereby placing the
earliest date of petroleum resource exploitation near the beginning of the 21st century.
162 The United States is dependent on oil for defense and industry.
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stantial, 163 the move further offshore to meet this nation's needs for
petroleum will occur sooner than anticipated. If the Treaty is to serve
as a "constitution for the sea," 1" encompassing all potential sources of
controversy, surely it should contain provisions covering the develop-
ment of these essential resources before it is adopted by any country.
The United States delegation and the private petroleum industry
should become more active in future negotiations to ensure that these
provisions are included, and that the Treaty adequately protects the
United States interests in access to these resources. 165 While the Rea-
gan Administration is reviewing the Draft, the glaring lack of a regime
for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources beyond the
200 mile EEZ should be remedied so the Treaty may be deemed
acceptable.
To make the Treaty acceptable, the United States and the petro-
leum industry should insist on changes in the administrative, opera-
tional, and funding system of the Authority. 66 At present, the United
States is not assured of adequate representation on any body of the
Authority. The one United States vote in the Assembly fails to ade-
quately reflect the population, wealth, and technological power of the
United States.' 6 7 The makeup of the Council and the Commission
consists mainly of developing and socialist countries, with capitalist
countries assured of substantially less than a majority of seats.'68 The
United States delegation should insist upon more adequate representa-
tion in the Assembly and a guarantee of at least one seat in the Council
and the Commission.
The Draft currently reflects the developing countries' desire to
control the mineral resources of the deep seabed and direct the actions
of global institutions169 in their quest to create a "New International
163 See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1981, at 15, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1981, at 8, col 1; Wall
St. J., Mar. 13, 1981, at 8, col. 5; Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1981, at 23, col. 4; Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1981,
at 8, col. 3; Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1981, at 12, col. 5.
164 Johnson & van Voorst, supra note 5.
165 The lack of participation by the petroleum industry in the proceedings of UNCLOS III is
noteworthy. Also worth noting is the lack of discussion and debate about provisions concerning
petroleum exploitation by any of the delegations. For an analysis of the petroleum industry's
interest in international regulation of offshore oil production, see A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 180-83 (1981).
166 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
167 Breaux, supra note 100, at 284.
168 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
169 Breaux, supra note 100, at 278. See also Draft, supra note 7, art. 161 (make-up of the
Council); Safire, supra note 29; Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1981, at 14, col. 1; Lilla, supra note 28; Bus.
WEEK, Mar. 16, 1981, at 29.
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Economic Order."' 70 The Authority, which has the sole power to grant
contracts for the exploitation of deep seabed resources, is authorized to
discriminate in favor of the developing countries and the Enterprise in
granting these contracts.' 7 ' Since the exploitable petroleum resources
of the deep seabed may be minimal, this system could effectively pre-
clude United States companies from obtaining access to these
resources.
The structure of the Enterprise is also objectionable. Besides the
competitive advantages noted earlier, 72 the system for the reservation
of sites may create substantial burdens. If predictions about the rela-
tively small amounts of exploitable petroleum resources in the deep
seabed are correct, it may become virtually impossible for developers to
find two exploitable sites. Further, if the sites are contiguous, the possi-
bility exists that the pool will underlie both sites, or that there will actu-
ally be only one site. 17 In that event, it seems likely that the Enterprise
will retain rights to the site, and it may prevent the private developer
from exploiting any of the supply. Considering the large sum invested,
this will deter private companies from advancing into the deep seabed.
To make the Treaty fair, developers should be allowed to choose
between several alternative methods to satisfy their obligations to the
Enterprise. For example, a developer could be permitted to find a site
for the Enterprise to exploit, to agree to pay a larger tax, or to contrib-
ute discovered resources directly to the Enterprise. This more realistic
approach would be consistent with free enterprise.
Although the application fee and the "ground rent" sums 174 seem
reasonable, the present taxation system should not be applied mutatis
mutandis to recovered petroleum resources. The present rates are un-
duly high'75 and, when coupled with the application fee, "ground
rent," and United States taxes, threaten to make the cost of deep seabed
production prohibitive. The conferees should devise a separate plan
for revenue sharing from recovered petroleum resources in light of the
high cost of exploratory ventures, the possibility that the amount of
recoverable petroleum at one site will be inadequate to cover develop-
ment costs, 17 6 and the expense involved in storing and transporting
170 Safire, supra note 29.
171 See, e.g., Draft, supra note 7, art. 82.
172 See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
173 See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3.
174 See supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
175 Id
176 The treaty presently contains provisions for recovery of development costs, but they are
inadequate. Draft, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 13(6)0).
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these resources.
The Treaty should not require the transfer of technology. The
Authority will receive funds sufficient to purchase any equipment
needed on the open market or to develop its own. In addition, the En-
terprise may enter into joint ventures with other developers.17 7
Through this system, the Enterprise can obtain all needed equipment.
The present status of the provisions for mandatory transfer of
technology are particularly troublesome. The United States delegation
completely acquiesced to the developing countries' demands, agreeing
to transfer technology to the developing countries, as well as to the En-
terprise. This is contrary to the American free enterprise system, under
which inventions are voluntarily sold in the open market place after
arms-length bargaining. Even if one agrees that the developed coun-
tries should not be the only beneficiaries of seabed resources solely be-
cause they have the necessary technology, mandatory transfer of all
technology utilized in the Area extends this concept too far. It is unfair
to maintain that developed countries have a duty to raise the develop-
ing countries to a higher technological level when they disadvantage
themselves in so doing. This is essentially what the Treaty would effec-
tuate. Additionally, there is no provision for the protection of the de-
velopers' interests. There is nothing to prevent the Enterprise or
developing countries from subsequently sharing this technology with
other nations or groups, and there is no assurance that the developers
will be adequately reimbursed. 7 ' In light of the substantial research
and investments needed to develop this technology, these provisions
discriminate against the developed countries and could discourage pri-
vate industry from undertaking such ventures.
The provisions for marine scientific research on the outer conti-
nental shelf should also be revised. Since this area will probably be
exploited in the near future, it is imperative to obtain more data about
the area's geological structure and petroleum potential. The present
text unjustifiably grants coastal states the discretion to veto research
related to exploration and exploitation of natural resources. 179 All na-
tions are interested in gaining access to these resources and this re-
quires the rapid acquisition of knowledge.18 0 Furthermore, the high
177 Richardson, supra note 44, at 63.
178 The Treaty requires sale to the Enterprise, even if a loss is incurred, and assured access to
all technology used in the Area. If such assurance is not given, then the technology cannot be
used. Draft, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 5.
179 Id art. 246(5). See also supra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
180 Information obtained must be shared at least with the Authority and the coastal state to
protect the interests of the coastal state and the developing countries. Id art. 244.
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costs of development require obtaining information concerning the
economic feasibility of development. To obtain this type of informa-
tion, researchers want assurances of access to areas they feel will yield
valuable information. The coastal states' desire to protect their inter-
ests is understandable, but the provisions for consent, implied consent,
dissemination of information, and inclusion of coastal nationals in the
project provide sufficient protection without discriminating against re-
search related to the exploration and exploitation of petroleum re-
sources.'"" Thus, the provision allowing coastal states to discriminate
against research related to exploitation of resources should be deleted.
The United States may have to alter its view of the free market
system and accomodate itself to other nations because it is engaging in
an international venture when it seeks to exploit ocean resources. This
should not mean, however, that the United States has to adopt in toto
the "opposing blueprint of economic development' 82 of the develop-
ing countries, as well as their theories of legal order and political ideol-
ogy. An erroneous premise underlying the UNCLOS III negotiations
is that the controversy between the developed and developing countries
stems from the selfish mining interests of the developed countries juxta-
posed against the developing countries' desire for international distrib-
utive justice. 8 3 From this conffict, a "fair and reasonable package
deal" 184 was to emerge that accomodated the views of all prospective
state parties to the Treaty. The current Draft will require private
United States companies to find potential petroleum deposits for them-
selves, as well as the developing countries, teach the developing coun-
tries how to conduct research offshore at the companies' expense,
transfer technology to developing countries through the Enterprise, and
then pay large royalties so that the developing countries can compete
with the companies for those resources. Rather than creating a fair and
reasonable compromise, it seems as if the developing countries have
convinced the negotiators that the "New International Economic Or-
der" is the appropriate model for future international law. This is not
the intended result of the Treaty. There is no reason to believe that the
United States or the petroleum industry should operate under anything
but a free market structure in its present and future domestic and inter-
national relations. Although the compromise of some principles may
be necessary and commendable in the international arena, the total ab-
181 Id arts. 238-57.
182 Goldie, supra note 14, at 294.
183 Id
184 Aldrich, Law of the Sea, DEPT. STATE BULL., Feb. 1981, at 57-58.
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dication of these principles is not. When negotiations continue, the
United States delegation should confirm its belief in the free enterprise
system and endeavor to make the next draft a true compromise of these
conflicting economic policies.
Finally, it appears that the United States delegation will have al-
ready realized that a grandfather clause ought to be included in the
Treaty before it is ratified. 85 The present Draft essentially calls for a
moratorium on the development of non-metallic resources in the deep
seabed. This means that a considerable amount of time would pass
before a regime would be established. 8 6 Whether or not the delegates
to the Convention and private industry continue to maintain that there
is no immediate need to include a regime for oil and gas production in
the deep seabed before the Treaty is ratified, delegates should insist on
the addition of a grandfather clause which, at the very least, would
protect the financial investments of the private petroleum industry in
exploring and exploiting the Area.
CONCLUSION
The Treaty devised at UNCLOS III is the most comprehensive
document ever prepared on the world's oceans. The latest Draft is
designed to address all the major issues related to use of the world's
oceans. Yet, serious problems remain which make the Treaty unac-
ceptable from the viewpoint of the United States and its private petro-
leum industry.
The failure of the negotiators to develop a regime for the resources
of the deep seabed, other than nodules, is particularly problematic.
Even if the decision to exclude such a regime is justifiable, under no
analysis can one justify the decision to impose a moratorium on the
development of these resources, nor the failure of the United States
delegation to insist on the inclusion of a grandfather clause. The im-
portance of assured access to oil and gas by the United States is pain-
fully evident, and the failure of our delegation to protect these interests
adequately should be remedied once negotiations resume. There is no
doubt that the United States will continue to need increasing amounts
185 The United States had to resort to unilateral legislation for the mining of manganese nod-
ules because of the length of the negotiations. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553-86 (1980), codofedat 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-73 (West Supp. 1982). The act
includes a grandfather clause. The Act has been denounced by the developing countries, who
continue to refuse to acknowledge leases granted prior to the adoption of the Treaty. See Nandan
Statement, supra note 153.
186 Besides the length of time negotiations require, the Reagan Administration halt on the ne-
gotiation of substantive matters will slow down progress.
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of oil and gas and that exploitation will move farther offshore. Our
industries should be allowed to respond to the demands for these re-
sources without fearing that their investments may be sacrificed.
187
The effect of the current Draft on the oil and gas industry seems
substantial. Therefore, United States delegates should have taken a
more active role in the negotiations to assure that their interests were
protected. 188 The Reagan Administration, in its review, should ensure
that future United States delegates to UNCLOS III actively seek the
development of a fair regime for the petroleum industry.
Although authors have concluded that there is no need for a com-
prehensive regime related to oil and gas exploration and exploitation in
the deep seabed,189 or that, indeed, there is really no need for a treaty at
all, it seems likely that a treaty eventually will be signed. 9 Thus, the
United States delegation and the oil and gas industry should take
measures to assure United States access to the petroleum resources on
the ocean floor in a form that will sufficiently protect private industry
and the free enterprise system. Otherwise, the Treaty may jeopardize
the United States future supply of petroleum and thereby adversely af-
fect national security, economic development, and international
strength.
Marlene Dubow
187 For a discussion of the necessity of providing security for investments made by the petro-
leum industry, see NPC 1973, supra note 52, at 17-23.
188 Although the National Petroleum Council has made several recommendations to Congress,
none of them have been adopted. See NPC 1969, supra note 47; NPC 1973, supra note 52; NPC
1975, supra note 47.
189 See e.g., Breaux, supra note 100, at 289-91.
190 "The interest of the negotiators in achieving some tangible results from the drawn-out nego-
tiations almost rules out the possibility that nothing will emerge." Hollick, The Third U.N. Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea.: Caracas Review, in R. AMACKER & R. SWEENEY, THE LAW OF THE
SEA: U.S. INTERESTS & ALTERNATIVES 123 (1976). In addition, the United States Navy wants the
Treaty to be concluded, as it guarantees free navigation through any of the world's stfaits 12 miles
from the coast. This guarantee provides assurance that United States naval power can be brought
anywhere in the world. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1981, at 3, col. 3.
